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Abstract
Note: This is a preprint. An abridged
version of this paper will be pre-
sented/performed under the title
“Identity dilemmas on Facebook” at
the Symposium on the Dynamics of
the Internet and Society “A Decade in
Internet Time” to be held Wednesday
21 - Saturday 24 September 2011 at the
Oxford Internet Institute, University of
Oxford, UK.
Uno, Nessuno, Centomila (“One, No One and One Hundred Thou-
sand”) is a classic novel by Italian playwright Luigi Pirandello. Pub-
lished in 1925, it recounts the tragedy of Vitangelo Moscarda, a man
who struggles to reclaim a coherent and unitary identity for himself
in the face of an inherently social and multi-faceted world. What
would Moscarda identity tragedy look like today? In this article we
transplant Moscarda’s identity play from its offline setting to the con-
temporary arena of social media and online social networks. With
reference to established theories on identity construction, perfor-
mance, and self-presentation, we re-imagine how Moscarda would
go about defending the integrity of his selfhood in the face of the
discountenancing influences of the online world.
You have one identity. [...] The days of you having a different image for your
co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end
pretty quickly. [...] Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack
of integrity.
Mark Zuckerberg
Introduction
With the growing permeation of online social networks in our ev-
eryday life, scholars have become interested in the study of novel
forms of identity construction, performance, spectatorship and self-
presentation onto the networked medium. This body of research
builds upon a rich theoretical tradition on identity constructivism,
performance and (re)presentation of self. With this article we attempt
to integrate the work of Italian playwright Luigi Pirandello into this
tradition.
Pirandello’s classic 1925 novel Uno, Nessuno, Centomila (“One, No
One and One Hundred Thousand") recounts the tragedy of a man
who struggles to reclaim a coherent identity for himself in the face of
an inherently social and multi-faceted world. Via an innocuous obser-
vation of his wife, the protagonist of the novel, Vitangelo Moscarda,
discovers that his friends’ perceptions of his character are not at all
what he imagined and stand in glaring contrast to his private self-
understanding. In order to upset their assumptions, and to salvage
some sort of stable identity, he embarks upon a series of carefully
crafted social experiments.
Though the novel’s story transpires in a pre-digital age, the volatile
play of identity that ultimately destabilizes Moscarda has only in-
creased since the advent of online social networks. The constant flux
of communication in the online world frustrates almost any effort
at constructing and defending unitary identity projections. Popular
social networking sites, such as Facebook and MySpace, offer freely
accessible and often jarring forums in which widely heterogeneous
aspects of one’s life—that in Moscarda’s era could have been scrupu-
lously kept apart—precariously intermingle. Disturbances to our
sense of a unified identity have become a matter of everyday life.
Pirandello’s prescient novel offered readers in its day the contours
of an identity melee that would unfurl on the online arena some 80
years later. Reading Uno, Nessuno e Centomila in light of established
and emerging theories on identity construction, we re-imagine how
Moscarda would go about defending the integrity of his selfhood
in the face of the discountenancing influences of the online world.
In other words, we address the following question: How would
Moscarda’s tragedy play out in the inherently networked world of
today? This article hopes to shed light on contemporary dilemmas
of identity constructivism and self-representation while simultane-
ously re-evaluating one of the most celebrated works of one of Italy’s
profoundest thinkers on identity and personhood.
This article begins with a synopsis of Pirandello’s novel, presented
in the next section. The remainder of the article analyses in detail
four crucial episodes of the novel that we attempt to reframe from
their original offline, place-based setting, to the contemporary online
stage, in which offline, physical interactions necessarily intersect with
the networked digital medium.
The drama of Vitangelo Moscarda
Uno, Nessuno e Centomila is Pirandello’s last and possibly most com-
plete novel. Published in 1925 in eight chapters (books), it is the
result of nearly 20 years of intense, yet oft-interrupted, work. De-
spite this long and difficult period of preparation, the novel is a lucid
compendium of the central themes in Pirandello’s thought. In this
section, we present a synopsis of the novel and its central themes,
focusing on the four episodes that are further discussed in the follow-
ing sections1. 1 All excerpts (and relative page num-
bers) of One, No One and One Hun-
dred Thousand in this and following
sections refer to the edition and transla-
tion of the book listed in the references
(Pirandello, 1990).
One, No one and One Hundred Thousand tells the tragedy of
Vitangelo Moscarda, “a man whose great aim was to see clearly and
be truly himself" (p. xiii). In the narrative style of the bildungsroman,
Moscarda recounts his troubled experience of identity as a first-
person narrator. The opening lines of the novel (p.3) set the stage for
the entire novel:
«What are you doing?», my wife asked, seeing me linger, unusually in
front of the mirror.
«Nothing», I replied. «Just looking at myself, at my nose, here, inside
this nostril. When I press it, I feel a little pain».
My wife smiled and said: «I thought you were looking to see which
way it tilts».
I wheeled around like a dog whose tail has been stepped on.
«Tilts? My nose?»
With this sudden, unexpected, and accidental realization - that
his nose tilts - Moscarda begins his dramatic journey to discover
his own self. The tilted nose is the “first germ of the sickness" (p. 7)
through which Moscarda begins to question his own public image as
he apprehends that his acquaintances have constructed, in their own
imagination, a Moscarda persona that is likely to be different from
his own: “I believed everyone saw me as a Moscarda with a straight
nose, whereas everyone saw a Moscarda with a bent nose" (p. 6) and
“I was obsessed by the thought that for others I was not what till
now, privately, I had imagined myself to be" (p. 7). This realization
soon becomes an identity dilemma - “if for the others I was not the
one I had always believed I was for myself, who was I?" (p. 12) - that
culminates in a number of experiments with his own identity.
As a first experiment, Moscarda tries to experience his own per-
sona from the point of view of an outsider: “I wanted to be alone in
a quite unusual, new way, [...] namely, without myself and, in fact,
with an outsider present" (p. 11). He sets himself before a mirror
with the intent to watch himself “live" from the outside; to catch
himself in the most natural actions and expressions. This initial ex-
periment is the first in a number of “necessary follies" that Moscarda
performs to explore the public perception of his own persona and
identity. It is discussed more in detail and reframed in the arena of
online social networks in the next section, “The mirror experiment".
So-who is Moscarda? He is the director of a bank in the small
town of Richieri-a bank he inherited from his father but that he
knows very little about: “I had two faithful friends, Sebastiano Quan-
torzo and Stefano Firbo, to handle my affairs after the death of my fa-
ther, who, though he tried in every way, had never succeeded in mak-
ing me accomplish anything; except taking a wife" (p. 4). Moscarda’s
first experiment helps him throw some light on his past and on the
public’s perception of his business persona. At work, he comes to
realize, for example, that most people regard him (and his father)
as a “usurer", rather than a “banker". In the family, he begins to un-
derstand the undertones of the nickname (“Gengè") given to him
by his wife Dida. “Ah, yes- for the others a usurer; [...] for my wife,
Dida, a fool." (p. 57). A surprising mosaic of identities slowly unveils
itself before Moscarda, and his aim becomes the deconstruction of
this mosaic and every connotation associated with it: “I decided to
discover who I was at least for those closest to me, my so-called ac-
quaintances, and to amuse myself by dismantling spitefully the me
that I was for them" (p. 22). He chooses Marco Di Dio as the “victim"
for his next experiment.
Marco Di Dio is a local inventor in the town of Richieri. He as-
pired to great wealth and fame and received financial favors from
both Moscarda and his father to keep his projects going. In addition,
Moscarda’s family allowed him to lodge in a rundown building on
the edge of their property for many years, free of charge. In order to
prove himself “differently from one of the hundred thousand in which
[he] lived" (p. 74), Moscarda sets in motion a detailed plan to evict
Di Dio and his wife from the building. The eviction turns out to be a
bureaucratic nightmare but eventually Moscarda manages to toss Di
Dio and his wife out into the street on a rainy winter day. A crowd
of bystanders witness the eviction and sharply criticize Moscarda:
“More disgusting than his father!", “In the rain, if you please! He
wouldn’t even wait till tomorrow!", “Usurer! Usurer!". But then,
to everyone’s astonishment, Moscarda’s lawyer announces that the
evicted tenant will be donated one of Moscarda’s more comfortable
properties. With this unexplainable gesture, Moscarda earns the label
of “madman" but successfully executes his experiment, proving to
others that he could be “someone different from the man [he] was
believed to be" (p. 95). This experiment is discussed at greater length
and in terms of identity construction theory below, in the section
titled “The Marco Di Dio experiment".
After the eviction of Marco Di Dio, Moscarda’s closest family
and acquaintances-Dida, Firbo and Quantorzo-fear that Moscarda
will commit new follies. Returning home from a walk with his dog,
Moscarda finds his wife Dida conversing with the bank manager
Quantorzo in the living room. Fresh from a meditation about identity
and the “sight of the others" (p. 104), Moscarda realizes that there are
not simply three people in the room (himself, Dida and Quantorzo).
Rather, he recognizes eight different characters (p. 108):
1. Dida, as she was for herself;
2. Dida, as she was for me;
3. Dida, as she was for Quantorzo;
4. Quantorzo, as he was for himself;
5. Quantorzo, as he was for Dida;
6. Quantorzo, as he was for me;
7. Dida’s dear Gengè;
8. Quantorzo’s dear Vitangelo.
Moscarda does not include the missing ninth character-himself
as he was for himself- having realized during his meditation that he
was no one for himself. In the eccentric discussion that follows (be-
tween these eight characters), Dida and Quantorzo try to persuade
Moscarda to stay calm and respect the managerial decisions of Firbo
and Quantorzo. But it is too late, as Moscarda, who had never in-
volved himself with bank affairs in the past, has already decided to
force the bank into liquidation-a gesture aimed at extinguishing the
image that others had constructed of him: “no longer usurer (that
bank was done with!) and no longer Gengè (that marionette was
done with, too!)" (p. 119). This discussion between Moscarda, Dida,
and Quantorzo is revisited below in the section “Conversing with
Dida and Quantorzo".
The last two chapters of the novel (Books Seven and Eight) rep-
resent a narrative and stylistic departure from the rest of the story.
Moscarda is invited to visit Anna Rosa, a friend of his wife that he
hardly knows. While Moscarda is conversing with her, she inadver-
tently drops her handbag, setting off a revolver inside and wounding
her foot. During her recovery, Moscarda visits Anna Rosa regularly
and becomes very attached to her. He comes to realize that she too
is uncertain of her “authentic" identity and he introduces her to his
tragedy and to his meditations on identity. Anna Rosa grows fasci-
nated with Moscarda and his ideas to that point that, in a state of
mental confusion, shoots him from her bed using the same revolver
that had caused her injury (p.152):
From that bed, a moment later, I rolled down blind, mortally wounded
in the chest by the little revolver she kept under her pillow. The rea-
sons she gave later in her defense must be true: namely, that she was
driven to kill me by the instinctive, sudden horror of the act into which
she felt she was drawn by the strange fascination of everything I had
said to her during those days.
Moscarda is taken to a hospital and upon recovering decides
to “set an exemplary and solemn example of repentance and self-
sacrifice" (p.158) by donating all his possessions and joining a home
for the destitute. When called upon to testify against Anna Rosa,
Moscarda successfully absolves her of the crime. Once in the home,
Moscarda is a transformed man. He has lost interest in public per-
ceptions of his name and persona. He lives life moment by moment,
leaving memories and names behind (p.160):
And the air is new. And everything, instant by instant, is as it is,
preparing to appear. [...] This is the only way I can live now. To be
reborn moment by moment. [...] I die at every instant, and I am reborn,
new and without memories: live and whole, no longer inside myself,
but in every thing outside.
These final events of the novel are revisited in the section titled
“Epilogue".
The mirror experiment
We begin our revisitation of Uno, Nessuno, Centomila with Moscarda’s
first identity experiment in which he attempts to watch himself “live"
in front of a mirror. This experiment is driven by Moscarda’s desire
to experience the image of himself from the gazing perspective of
an outsider. There is a long tradition of linking identity troubles to
mirrors and other reflective surfaces. Over a century ago, Cooley
created the concept of the looking-glass self. He proposed that an
individual constructs an understanding of her “self" via others’ per-
ceptions in society, i.e., by imagining how she is perceived by others
and developing an emotional response based on their judgments
(Cooley, 1902). Mead (1934) further extended Cooley’s theory, posit-
ing that the construction of the self happens entirely through social
interaction. Reflexivity - experiencing oneself (as an object) from the
standpoint of others - is still a core concept in Mead’s theories, but
the focus shifts to the interaction with the social world. Under the
same rubric, and particularly relevant to the present discussion, is
the dramaturgic work of Goffman (1959). In The Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life, Goffman posits the self as a malleable and elastic entity
that is entirely shaped by the expectations formed by its interaction
with the social world, the audience, and the stage. Again, the process
of anticipating, interpreting, and assimilating the perception of others
- similar to Moscarda’s attempts to experience the outsider gaze - is a
key notion in Goffman’s work and is echoed in the work of contem-
porary theorists writing about online identity (Boyd, 2008; Pearson,
2008; Robinson, 2007; Van Kokswijk, 2009). We attempt to reframe
this notion in a contemporary context, by posing the question: how
would Moscarda perform the mirror experiment were he alive today?
At the time at which Pirandello’s story unfolds - the early twen-
tieth century - cinematography was in its infancy and a mirror was
the most readily available and convenient tool to experience the out-
sider gaze. A contemporary Moscarda could make use of much more
sophisticated technological devices. For the present discussion, we
will leave high-tech stratagems aside - such as closed-circuit tele-
vision, and illusory out-of-body experiences (Ehrsson, 2007) - and
focus on what the outsider gaze experiment would entail regarding
the present-day permeation of online social networks in our lives.
Because modern identity issues necessarily extend beyond physical,
offline fori, we speculate that a present-day Moscarda would be as
concerned about the public perception of his physical persona as that
of his virtual one. In other words, a Moscarda of the day would be
curious to explore how he is portrayed and perceived both offline, in
the real world, and online, on social media.
It has been noted that the most common mechanism for present-
ing one’s identity online on social networking sites is the personal
profile (Boyd and Herr, 2006). A personal profile, is a web page con-
sisting of personal information, such as name, occupation, location,
relationship status, a diary, photographs, videos and other sorts of
personal media. Despite the variety of services and options offered
by different social networking sites the basic function of a profile is
to present one’s identity. A personal profile is thus the component
of one’s online identity that best approximates one’s physical, public
appearance.
We can then imagine that a present-day Moscarda would be curi-
ous to explore the ways in which he appears to others online. How
could Moscarda achieve this? The simplest way would be by scru-
tinizing his own personal profile, attempting to imagine how oth-
ers would perceive it. In other words, Moscarda would perform a
modern version of the mirror experiment by logging into his social
networking sites of choice, displaying, and perusing his personal pro-
file page. An experiment that consists of merely scrutinizing one’s
own profile might appear trivial at first, but the highly malleable,
dynamic, and real-time nature of social networking sites makes this
experiment worth exploring more in detail.
User profiles consist of variegated types of information. First and
foremost, they contain personal information entered by their owners,
such as name, a profile picture, relationship status, a biography,
and photos. For example, Moscarda might have created a profile
with information about his occupation (“banker"), his relationship
status (“married to Dida"), and a profile picture. Moreover, he may
choose to use the popular microblogging feature included in many
social networks to share real-time news about himself as a brief text
update (e.g., “Moscarda is going to the bank"). A second category
of information generally present on social network profiles relates to
activities in the user social timeline. This includes information about
recently established friendships (e.g., “Moscarda is now friend with
***"), relationships (“Moscarda is now in a relationship with ***"),
and social events (e.g., “Moscarda attended the event ***"). Many
of these updates are triggered by users’ interactions, e.g., accepting
a friend request triggers an automated update. A third category of
information found on user profiles is public content posted by third
parties-friends, acquaintances, strangers, applications-in the form
of text comments, “wall posts" (profile annotations), tagged images
and similar media content. For example, Dida might post a photo of
Moscarda on his profile, making it publicly available and viewable to
anyone visiting his profile (“Moscarda was tagged in a photo").
It is important to differentiate between these categories because
they constitute three different levels of authorship and three different
mechanisms by which aspects of one’s identity are revealed. The first
category of information discussed above is under the direct control
of the users, i.e., the owners of online profiles. The user carefully
selects certain pieces of information to exhibit to the online world
in order to fashion a desired image. As such, these exhibits may be
subject to constant manipulation or curatorial effort. However, this
form of identity construction is not exclusive to the online realm. As
Moscarda (Pirandello, 1990:41) puts it:
Do you believe you can know yourselves if you don’t somehow con-
struct yourselves? Or that I can know you if I don’t construct you in
my way? And can you know me if I don’t construct you in my way?
We can know only what we succeed in giving form to.
Similar to the ways by which people construct their personae and
play with their own physical appearance in the offline world-by act-
ing differently, by the application of make-up, by alternating attire,
and even by undergoing plastic surgery-online appearance is also
highly malleable: every morsel of information shared on a personal
profile can be edited, replaced, modified, or concealed by its own-
ers. This constant digital embellishment of one’s profile points to
the role of the social network as a performance stage, or a “space
for performing the self" (Chan, 2000:271). Users of online social net-
works “perform" and construct an online identity via a constantly
updated stream of text (microblogging messages, biographical notes,
photo comments), videos, and images. Photographic images, in par-
ticular, are the most direct and powerful means to stage one’s online
performance. In Pirandello’s days, photographic cameras were nei-
ther portable nor personal commodities. A present-day Moscarda,
however, would certainly experiment with photographic devices to
come to an understanding of his own self and appearance. Reflect-
ing on the importance of the photographic medium in everyday life,
Susan Sontag notes: “We learn to see ourselves photographically.
To regard oneself as attractive is, precisely, to judge that one would
look good in a photograph" (Sontag, 1979:85). Although Sontag was
writing about analog photography, her words reverberate even more
nowadays, for cameras are cheap, portable, and embedded in prac-
tically any electronic device. Cameras have become instrumental to
digital aestheticization. With regard to this, it is interesting to note
that a common practice among users of social networks, especially
teenagers, is to take self-portraits using portable digital cameras in
front of a mirror (Walker, 2007). Thus, the instrument employed by
Moscarda to experience the outsider gaze becomes a tool of online
identity construction and presentation.
While this first category of information consists of content that is
directly under the control and management of users of social net-
works (name, biographical sketch, profile photos, status updates), the
other two categories introduced above pertain to the social activities
of users and are generated by third parties. These include content
that is generated automatically by social networking sites (such as
information about new friendship, the results of an online quiz, etc.)
and other users (such as a new wall post from a friend, a new tagged
photo, etc.). Although privacy measures exist (to different extents) on
most social networking sites, by and large, information of this kind
ends up on a user profile and is thus visible to anyone visiting it.
In the pre-digital era, Moscarda could have kept this kind of in-
formation confidential. Of course, he could have shared it with a
restricted circle of family and friends of his choice, but the bulk of his
social activity would have gone largely undocumented, or confined
to informal discourse and gossip. The systematic documentation of
Moscarda’s social whereabouts and activities (e.g., “Moscarda is now
friend with ***") together with the traces left on his profile by third
parties (e.g., a wall post from a friend reading: “hello Moscarda, it
was great to see you yesterday at ***!") represents a crucial departure
from the traditional ways in which one’s identity is presented to the
world. It follows that a Moscarda that operates both offline and on-
line needs to control many more aspects of his identity to preserve a
coherent rendering of his persona, many of which are outside of his
direct control.
Some preliminary conclusions emerge from the revisitation of
this episode of Uno, Nessuno, Centomila. The offline Moscarda of
the 1900s was concerned with the public perception of his persona
and performed a mirror experiment to experience and analyze the
outsider gaze. A contemporary Moscarda would find himself in a
more complex landscape, for he would have to concern himself with
public perceptions of both his offline and his online personae. We
have imagined a modern Moscarda with an online profile on a social
networking site and discussed the various kinds of identity-related
information that would concern him in different ways. There would
be information that he personally posts to his profile and information
about his social whereabouts, activities and interaction with other
users, posted by third parties. In this context, a modern version of
the mirror experiment would force a present-day Moscarda to ac-
tively engage with his profile, manipulating it and curating it to his
own desire. The ability to continuously and dynamically rework his
profile would furthermore amplify Moscarda’s anxiety about the
presentation of his persona. With the aim of presenting a coherent
version of himself to the world, Moscarda would find himself engag-
ing in a dynamic process of identity construction through interaction.
Thus, a modern version of the mirror experiment is a dynamic, real-
time venture set in motion by our incessant preoccupation with the
appearance and integrity of our ever-changing online profiles2. 2 We are increasingly becoming con-
cerned with and alert to the status of
our online identity. For example, it is
not uncommon or unacceptable to rush
to a computer to remove an embarrass-
ing photo in which we were just tagged.
Along these lines, we have heard of
cases in which former couples meet
(in person) to negotiate their “break
up on Facebook", i.e., to tweak the
privacy settings on their profiles so to
silence or attenuate the public, online
announcement of their break up.
The Marco Di Dio experiment
While Moscarda’s first experiment is merely a self-observation from
the perspective of an outsider, in his second experiment, Moscarda
intends to deconstruct every connotation associated with his persona.
He delves into the ways he is perceived by others and finds that he
abhors the identities that live within him (the dear Gengè, the “son",
the usurer). The intention to break with these identities (“I warn
you, my friend, that I am not my father", p.88) is translated into a
carefully crafted experiment in which he first intensifies his role of
usurer, by publicly evicting Marco di Dio and his wife from their
house, and then smashes it to pieces by moving them into a much
more comfortable home, to the astonishment of everyone.
Moscarda’s second experiment is a social exercise of identity con-
struction and deconstruction. Yet, how do we go about constructing
identity in the first place? Let us turn to Jean-Paul Sartre and his
speculation that a French cafè waiter is ’playing a waiter’, not merely
’being a waiter’: “But what is he playing? We need not watch long
before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a cafe."
(Sartre, 1943). As beings birthed into pre-existing societal constella-
tions, we are outfitted with ready-made scripts and roles which we
can choose to adopt, perform and even improvise on. J. L. Austin
(1962) refers to these pre-scripted identities as “performatives." In its
original sense, the rubric “performative" was intended to apply to
certain “illocutionary" speech acts that were neither true nor false,
but “performative." For instance, the illocutionary act: “I pronounce
you husband and wife," performs what it says provided that certain
felicity conditions are met, e.g., the declarant has legal or religious
capacity to do so, the partners are willingly present, and they fulfill
certain legal and social prerequisites. Judith Butler (1999) expanded
upon Austin’s work to show that the term “performative" can be ex-
tended to cover a sizeable host of habitually uninterrogated social
roles and affectations. Though Butler concentrates her insights on
gender (certain conditions must be met for one to be able to enact a
certain gender), the same logical apparatus could just as well hold
true for the performative script associated with police officers, mas-
cots, the Sartrian waiter, as well as Moscarda. For example, in Uno,
Nessuno e Centomila, the town of Richieri perceives Moscarda as a
“usurer" for he fulfils all the felicity conditions: (1) he is the owner of
a bank that charges exorbitant interest rates (2) he lives by no other
means and (3) he loafs about town in utter disoccupation. With his
second experiment, Moscarda first evicts Marco Di Dio, and then
rewards him with a more comfortable house, leaving the people of
Richieri flummoxed. Public astonishment is what he had hoped for
by breaking away from the “usurer performative", by refusing to
perform its script. How would Moscarda go about enact a similar
performative construction and deconstruction in today’s networked
reality?
It is easy to imagine that a modern Moscarda would attempt to
dismantle the public perception of his persona by tweaking his
online performatives in unorthodox ways. There are innumerable
stratagems by which he could catalyze an identity crisis, proving to
others that he does not in fact embody certain pre-scripted identities:
he could post embarrassing photos of himself or his friends, publish
unusual, rude or politically incorrect comments, drastically change
his profile information, publicly reveal personal secrets, or remove
some of his crucial contacts. The list is potentially endless and not
limited to a single social network. Modern social networking sites
cater to different communities with different needs and different per-
formatives. For example, LinkedIn caters to professionals looking for
work, Match.com and similar dating sites cater to singles looking for
partners, the elitist network asmallworld, with its coteries of yacht-
ing aficionados, organizes exclusive get-togethers and connection
building for its members. MySpace, once the largest social network,
has recently reinvented itself as a music and media industry stage.
A Moscarda with profiles on these sites could play with his different
performatives catalyzing site-specific identity crises. The availabil-
ity and popularity of these many fori for identity construction and
manipulation inflate the possibilities for specialized performative
destabilization with ramifications both in the online and in the offline
realm3. In fact, one would think that the online social realm allows 3 Destabilizations of online performa-
tives have created episodes of real life
distress and hysteria. Examples on
Facebook include losing a job over
eccentric remarks on a status update
(http://www.hrzone.co.uk/item/171580,
and http://bit.ly/aJFL2n) and
a man stabbing his wife to
death after she changed her
relationship status to “single"
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7676285.stm).
for more games and experiments of identity performance than its
offline counterpart, for its immediate and dynamically constructed
nature.
But this is not always the case. The popular social networking
site Facebook is interesting to analyze in this context. With its sheer
population size (over half billion users at the time of writing) and an
unprecedented monopoly over users’ personal data, Facebook is a
forum in which multiple communities and societal roles necessarily
meet: these days, your parents, your children, your colleagues, and
your friends are all on Facebook. In such a diverse and highly popu-
lated environment, constructing, tweaking, and curating one’s online
representation is of crucial importance. Facebook, however, allows
its users a very limited range of identity maneuver. By encoding pre-
scriptive or formulaic alternatives within its system (gender: male or
female; religious views: Christian, Jewish etc.; Political views: liberal,
conservative, etc.), by slotting its users in preset geographical or asso-
ciational networks, by enforcing the authenticity of user profiles, and
by cloning everyone within the same spectrum of light blues and un-
adorned walls, Facebook regulates and limits its users’ possibilities of
representation. By contrast, Myspace gives its users full control over
the HTML of their profile pages and allows them to fully re-imagine
their profiles by redesigning backgrounds, colors, images, adding
music, video streaming, and often clunky and discordant graphics.
When the two sites are juxtaposed, Facebook’s drastic restrictions on
identity construction appear rather salient4. 4 Some have rebelled against the ap-
paratuses of control and regulation
posited by social media sites. For exam-
ple, a Fakester Manifesto was written
by people who crafted fake identities
on the Friendster social network, “in
defense of our right to exist in the form
we choose or assume", negating the
possibility of authentic or ’real’ profiles,
and trying to extricate themselves from
the webs of symbolic violence spun
out on these sites. We note, however,
that by fashioning aspirational profiles,
the Fakesters for the most part merely
endorse pre-scripted performative
identities which, for a lack of felicity
conditions, they are unable to carry off
in the real world (a sort of Second Life
fantasia). Moreover, by embracing a sort
of consumer choice identity-matrix, a
struggle in which only the most “inter-
esting" identities survive, the Fakesters
would appear to actually reinforce
those social cages which, like Moscarda,
they hope to escape.
Thus, even though the networked medium potentially enables
myriad experiments of performative destabilization, identity games
are limited by the techno-political boundaries designated by the ad-
ministrators and owners of these social networking sites. In this light,
one of the most fascinating phenomena on Facebook are its hortatory
“Take a Quiz" applications which permit individuals to engage in
carefully delimited role playing and identity experimentation, while
mitigating the risk that such performances would entail in the real
world (as Moscarda’s tragic fate demonstrates). The quizzes are man-
ifold in subject matter, running from Which Desperate Housewife are
you? to Which German Philosopher are you? and If you were a famous
serial killer, who would you be? The results are always quirky, ludic and
normative, and they legitimize identity experimentation at the same
time that they quell Pirandellian fears by providing authoritative
scripts. Also, their exclusions become less obvious over time. If for
Butler, mimicry and masquerade form the essence of identity, then
Facebook offers a padded playpen in which to explore the polyglot
nature of the self, while at the same time homogenizing its adher-
ents by excluding the radical and the troubling5. No matter how 5 This takes on a sinister air when one
delves a little into the political and
social stances of Facebook’s original
backers. Tom Hodkinson in his searing
article in The Guardian, “With Friends
Like These” (http://gu.com/p/xx49p),
singles out Peter Thiel, Zuckerberg’s
original underwriter, and one of Face-
book’s three board members. He notes:
“The real face behind Facebook is the
40-year-old Silicon Valley venture cap-
italist and futurist philosopher Peter
Thiel, [...] more than just a clever and
avaricious capitalist, he is a futurist
philosopher and neocon activist. A
philosophy graduate from Stanford, in
1998 he co-wrote a book called The Di-
versity Myth, which is a detailed attack
on liberalism and the multiculturalist
ideology that dominated Stanford. He
claimed that the "multiculture" led to
a lessening of individual freedoms."
Hodkinson warns that Thiel’s philoso-
phy and business agendas seek to scour
away social and cultural difference and
give rise to a homogenized and fungible
global populace.
wildly Moscarda responded to the quiz questions, he would unavoid-
ably find that his personality matched up with some eccentric but
palatable German philosopher, vivacious Desperate Housewife or
laughable serial killer.
More worringly perhaps, as Facebook gradually monopolizes the
social networking world market, its identity reductionism rubric
slowly fades from view. As Butler (1999:5) writes, “juridical subjects
are invariably produced through certain exclusionary practices that
do not ”show" once the juridical structure of politics has been es-
tablished." In an Orwellian fashion, taxonomies that are no longer
available become unthinkable, and users learn to desire only what
conditions make possible for them. Without the presence of alter-
native social networks to differentiate from Facebook, it becomes
difficult to even imagine those possibilities that have been excluded.
Conversing with Dida and Quantorzo
After the public debacle with Marco di Dio, Moscarda goes through
another phase of self-unravelment, through which he comes to real-
ize that he inhabits countless identities - as many as are the people
that know him or know of him. The climax of this realization comes
with the eccentric discussion between Dida and Quantorzo in which
Moscarda recognizes not only the three people conversing at the ta-
ble (Dida, Quantorzo, and himself), but an additional five characters
predicated upon the reciprocal perception of their identities (Dida as
she was for Quantorzo, Dida as she was for him, etc.)
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus", or embodied
disposition (Bourdieu, 1977), is helpful to analyze the confrontation
between Moscarda, Dida, and Quantorzo and its resulting discom-
forts. Bourdieu posits that individuals enter and subsequently exist
in different fields of activity, each of which bears its own complex
structure of social relations. Depending on their position in a given
social field (dominant or dominated, outsider or insider, etc.) they
develop a certain habitus typical of their position: not merely an as-
semblage of dispositions, opinions, taste, and aesthetic sensibility,
but also certain mannerisms, gestures, and tones of voice. Since each
social field places requirements on its participants for membership
within the field (certain dress, posture, and speech), actors vying for
membership tend to construct their habitus according the given social
organization of the field. In some respects, Bourdieu’s postulates are
consonant with Erving Goffman’s ideas on symbolic interactional-
ism: personal identity comes into being via social interaction, and
according to the different roles we play in different contexts.
In a multi-field world, actors routinely adopt and shed habituses
depending on their different standings in each field. Trouble and
discomfort arise when two different fields overlap synchronically,
and a particular actor is unsure what habitus to adopt. This clash of
habituses is emblematically portrayed in Uno, Nessuno, Centomila
in Moscarda’s confrontation with Dida and Quantorzo. In the midst
of his identity crisis, Moscarda finds himself anxiously caught in
a room with his wife, with whom he wear one habitus (“Gengè",
the submissive and almost nebbish husband), and his friend and
employee Quantorzo, with whom he wears a different one (that of
Vitangelo, authoritative bank owner and son of the renowned town
usurer).
The opportunities for a clashing of habituses - which in Moscarda’s
offline world amount to a discrete if discombobulating confrontation
- are manifold in the online realm. Social media sites offer open,
public, and constantly accessible forums for confrontations of this
kind - imagine a respected colleague, a childhood friend, and a close
relative posting wildly incongruent comments in response to an up-
date on your Facebook wall. These days, the discussion between
Moscarda, Dida, and Quantorzo could unfold on a public online
forum, in a private message exchange, or as a distributed game
of photo tagging and item commenting. Moreover, social network
spaces act as powerful vehicles for the display and transmission of
social preconceptions and assumptions similar to the ways that one
presents one’s habitus offline. Would Moscarda present the same
profile picture of himself on LinkedIn, Myspace, and Match.com?
Probably not.6 By corollary, his entire field of activity - the status of 6 It is easy to argue with this view.
The notion of habitus is not merely
about socialization. A critical feature
of habitus is also its embodiment.
Habituses are embodied in one’s bodily
gestures, mannerisms, and verbal
attitude. Thus, one could argue that
embodied verbal and visual clues
are probably not transmitted online
as well as they are offline, so that
the emergence of online habituses is
somehow limited by the narrow range
of bodily practices attainable on the
networked medium. However, recent
research shows that when online venues
preserve the dynamics of interactional
cuing, embodied offline cuing systems
are transmitted and redefined online:
“In creating online selves, users do not
seek to transcend the most fundamental
aspects of their offline selves. Rather,
users bring into being bodies, personas,
and personalities framed according to
the same categories that exist in the
offline world." (Robinson, 2007:94)
his habitus within a particular online universe - would be different in
each of these sites. Not only do social networking sites offer a forum
for habitus confrontation but they also provide the structural and
social conditions for the emergence of novel ad hoc habituses.
With these notions in mind, we can then imagine that a present-
time conversation between Moscarda, Dida, and Quantorzo is ani-
mated by many more characters than the eight posited by Pirandello
in a purely offline world. Let us suppose, for example, that Dida has
an online profile on the social networking site Facebook and that
both Moscarda and Quantorzo are familiar and keep up to date with
it. If this were the case, by entering the conversation, Dida would
be bringing to the table not only her two offline habituses (Dida, as
she is with/for Moscarda, and Dida, as she is with/for Quantorzo),
but also an additional character predicated upon her online “field of
activity" (Dida as she is on Facebook). With the presence and avail-
ability of several social networking sites, each giving the opportunity
to develop ad hoc habituses, it is easy to realize that the number of
characters at play is potentially very large (Dida as she is on Mys-
pace, Dida as she is on asmallworld, etc.). As noted by Van Kokswijk
(2008), this identity proliferation does not necessarily undermine the
integrity of one’s “real" identity. Rather, he contends that by having
different profiles and wearing different habituses, Dida (or anyone)
does not decentralize or diminish her identity; rather, she multiplies
it infinitely.
To add complexity to an already complex scenario, we should not
forget that social networking sites allow users to customize their pri-
vacy settings so that their online profiles appear differently to specific
people. Users are able to customize every aspect of their personal
profile, e.g. restricting certain portions of their profiles to certain con-
tacts and making other parts publicly available. This means that, at
any time, a person’s profile might appear different to two different
profile visitors that have been granted distinct access privileges. This
has immediate repercussions for the clash of habituses discussed
above. Dida’s field of activity on Facebook will not result anymore in
a unitary habitus (Dida as she is on Facebook), but of many different
ones (Dida as she is on Facebook to Moscarda, and Dida as she is on
Facebook to Quantorzo).
In this rich ecology of online personae, navigating through a
plethora of privacy settings and access privileges is not a trivial
task. Interestingly, to aid management of such complex and dis-
tributed identity configurations, Facebook allows you to “see how a
friend sees your profile", i.e., to display your profile exactly the way
it is seen by a given friend based on the selected privacy restrictions
(e.g., Moscarda could “see how Dida sees his profile"). Playing with
this functionality corresponds, in many respects, to performing a
customized version of the mirror experiment discussed earlier: expe-
riencing not a generic outsider gaze, but that of a specific outsider.
Epilogue
The final chapters of Uno, Nessuno, Centomila narrate the com-
plete breakdown and unraveling of Moscarda’s personality. Via his
carefully crafted experiments, Moscarda manages to dismantle the
multiple identities he was associated with: “no longer usurer (that
bank was done with!) and no longer Gengè (that marionette was
done with, too!)" (p. 119). But the search for his veritable self does
not turn out to be what he expected. The deconstruction of the mo-
saic of personae that lived within him ultimately leaves him with a
void: “But what other did I have inside me, except this torment that
revealed me as no one and one hundred thousand?" (p. 120).
The chain of unruly and tragic events that follows - with Anna
Rosa shooting her foot and then nearly murdering Moscarda - is a
metaphor for the latent but always potential violence that swims be-
neath the glassy surface of social relations, i.e. the violence that meets
those who seek to disrupt social conventions. The story culminates
with Moscarda surrendering to his own tragedy. He chooses to en-
tirely extricate himself from his social fabric and to live contentedly
by himself in a house for the destitute. There is no real catharsis to
this tragedy. Moscarda does not find his true self and abandons any
attempt to do so: “I no longer look at myself in the mirror, and it
never even occurs to me to want to know what has happened to my
face and to my whole appearance" (p. 159). By completely becoming
an outsider, he no longer has to pursue being an outsider to himself
in order to probe his identity. The analogy with today’s world is ob-
vious: the disintegration of Moscarda and his renunciation of a social
life is analogous to permanently logging off a social network.
However, logging off, quitting, or even temporarily abandoning
social networks is not easy. Sharing different aspects of one’s life
on social networks has become routine for many. In many respects,
social networks have become modern platforms for autobiographical
expression. When he inaugurated the modern autobiography with
his work Confessions, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1782) claimed that to
communicate one’s true identity, one must “tell all." “Such as I was,"
he writes, “I have declared myself; sometimes vile and despicable, at
others, virtuous, generous and sublime; even as thou hast read my
inmost soul." Rousseau’s stance can be profitably contrasted with the
circumspect revelations of identity one encounters in online social
networks. As discussed above, social network users endeavor only to
show “part": to slice and repackage their identities so as to manifest
only their most attractive aspects. This online cropping often reflects
similar stratagems in the analog world: “putting on one’s best face at
work," or attentively trying to make a “good first impression."
Yet, these efforts are counteracted by the thoroughly dynamic,
immediate and interactive nature of social networking sites that tac-
itly or often explicitly coerce their users to constantly act upon their
social circles: “Unlike everyday embodiment, there is no digital cor-
poreality without articulation. One cannot simply ’be’ online; one
must make one’s presence visible through explicit and structured
actions." (Boyd, 2008:149
cessantly prompted to contact friends who they have not been in
touch with lately (“Write on ***’s wall! Send her a message!"), and to
browse through endless lists of suggested friends (“Here are some
people you may know"). By incessantly reminding its users to send
messages or friend requests, to write on walls, to “like" or “not like,"
to “poke," to “give gifts," to choose role models via Take a Quiz and to
engage in a whole other range of formulaic activities, Facebook spurs
users to act upon their profiles and their online social environment.
In many respects, these are the ways by which Facebook recultures
and educates its users via its very own forms of “symbolic violence",
to use Bourdieu’s terminology. Thus, in the long run, despite any
user’s most resourceful exertions, the social network machine itself
soon begins to “tell all." The Facebook panopticon is such, with its
ceaseless feeds, updates, tags, pokes, gifts, city locators, and quiz re-
sults, that the flux and hydra-headed polyphony of the self leaches
onto the screen with a speed and nimbleness that overwhelms any
possible human counter-stratagems.
How could a modern Moscarda extricate himself from such a tan-
gled and resilient social fabric? Even committing a “digital hara-kiri"
- by deleting his account on every social networks he belongs to -
would not guarantee his escape from the online social world: pro-
files on some social networking sites (including Facebook) cannot be
erased. At the most, they can be deactivated. As such, our imagined
digital Moscarda, by signing up on Facebook, unwittingly subscribed
to a multimedia biography, written by hundreds of thousands of
authors, that will outlast himself.
No conclusion We pay homage to the work of Piran-
dello by titling the concluding section
of this article “No conclusion", as the
last section of the book. Accordingly,
we offer no definite and fixed conclu-
sion to our article. Rather, we would
like to leave this forum open for dis-
cussion as we urge other scholars to
embrace Pirandello’s ideas in their
work on online identity and perfor-
mance.
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